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Law Outlines Administrative law: Legislation and Regulation Outlines

Legislation Regulation Administrative Law Full Course Outline

Updated Legislation Regulation Administrative Law Full Course Outline Notes

Administrative law: Legislation and Regulation Outlines

Administrative law: Legislation and Regulation

Approximately 128 pages

Hello! These are my notes and outline for Administrative Law Legislation and Regulation, based on the textbook Breyer, et al., Administrative Law and Regulatory Policy (8th ed.).

The Full Course Outline contains detailed case briefs along with lecture notes from class, which I took with one of the authors of the textbook. It is very helpful for learning the backgrounds and key holdings from major administrative law cases, along with the lecture notes providing plain-language explanations of w...

The following is a more accessible plain text extract of the PDF sample above, taken from our Administrative law: Legislation and Regulation Outlines. Due to the challenges of extracting text from PDFs, it will have odd formatting:

*NB: this outline accords with Brewer et al., Administrative Law and Regulatory Policy (8th ed.)

Smith v United States (1993)

SCOTUS

  1. Rule of Law

    1. When interpreting a statute, a court may determine the text’s ordinary meaning by reference to dictionary definitions.

  2. Facts

    1. Petitioner: John Angus Smith

    2. Defendant: USG

    3. P and companion went from Tennessee to Florida to buy cocaine, hoping to resell it at a profit. P and companion met P’s acquaintance, Deborah Hoag. Hoag purchased cocaine for P. P, companion, and Hoag met drug dealer in motel room, where P expressed that he wants to sell his gun. Hoag informs police, who send undercover to pose as pawnbroker. Policeman attempted to buy the gun, but P said P wants cocaine is exchange for the gun. Police left, saying he would return with drugs. P was then observed leaving the hotel room with the gun, and police give chase and arrest P.

    4. P is charged with, among other offenses, two drug trafficking crimes. P is convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), which prohibits “knowingly using a firearm during and in relation to a drug-trafficking crime.”

    5. P argues that exchanging firearm for drugs does not constitute use, since the firearm was not used as a weapon, which is how firearms are most often used.

    6. Statute does not define the word “use.”

  3. Procedural History

    1. Jury convicted petitioner on all counts. Court of Appeals affirmed.

  4. Legal Question

    1. Whether trading a firearm for drugs and constitute “use” of the firearm within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1).

  5. Holding and Reasoning: O’Connor (Blackmun concurring)

    1. Yes, because a word undefined by statute is normally construed in accord with its natural meaning; and language must be interpreted in the context, which includes the rest of the statute, and one narrow interpretation does not exclude others; and the rule of lenity does not apply because the possibility of a narrow reading does not render the word ambiguous.

    2. Argument for:

      1. When a word is not defined by statute, we normally construe it in accord with ordinary or natural meaning.

        1. Webster’s Dictionary: use is to convert to one’s service, to employ

        2. By attempting to trade his MAC–10 for the drugs, he “used” or “employed” it as an item of barter to obtain cocaine; he “derived service” from it because it was going to bring him the very drugs he sought.

      2. P claims statute should require proof that P used firearm “as a weapon,” but the words “as a weapon” appear nowhere in the statute. Congress could have included such language if it so wished.

      3. Language must be interpreted within context.

        1. P argues that “use” must be interpreted within context of “firearm.” But it is one thing to argue “use” includes use as a weapon, but another to argue that it excludes any other use.

        2. An additional section of the statute deals with the seizure of firearms and includes, on its list of offenses, the use of firearms for barter or commerce. Clearly, the statute contemplates a broader use for weapons than just violent use.

      4. Finally, the rule of lenity provides that any ambiguities in the text of a criminal statute must be construed in favor of a criminal defendant. However, the rule of lenity does not apply here, because the possibility of reading a word more narrowly does not render the word ambiguous.

    3. Conviction upheld. Judgment of Court of Appeals affirmed.

  6. Dissent: Scalia (Stevens and Souter concurring)

    1. No, because use means use for its intended purpose; the meaning of use varies with context within the statute; and the debate suggests ambiguity and therefore that the rule of lenity should apply.

    2. Arguments for:

      1. We give nontechnical words their ordinary meaning. The ordinary meaning of ‘use’ is “use for its intended purpose.”

      2. In the context of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), use of firearm means using the firearm as a weapon.

        1. With common words, context is key, and words will have varying meanings across a statute. Although one section of the statute refers to using weapons in commerce, “use” is a common word and may have other meanings elsewhere in the statute.

      3. Finally, this debate over the meaning of the word “use” shows that the statute is sufficiently ambiguous that the rule of lenity should apply in favor of Smith.

Riggs v. Palmer (1889)

Court of Appeals of New York

  1. Rule of Law

    1. When interpreting a statute, a court may depart from the statute’s clear text in order to avoid an absurd result.

  2. Facts

    1. Plaintiffs: Mrs. Riggs and Mrs. Preston, daughters of Francis Palmer.

    2. Defendant: Elmer Palmer, grandson of Francis Palmer.

    3. Francis made a will and testament: leaving small legacies to his daughters, the plaintiffs; and leaving the remainder to Elmer, the defendant, subject to the support of D’s mother, Mrs. Susan Palmer; and with a gift over to the daughters, subject to support of D’s mother, should D survive Francis and die underage, unmarried, and without any issue.

    4. Francis was a widower and had remarried to Mrs. Bresse, but signed a pre-nuptial, wherein Bresse forfeited claims to his estate.

    5. D lived with Francis and was 16 years old when Francis died. D knew of provisions in D’s favor in the will. In order to prevent revocation of these provisions, and to obtain them more quickly, he murdered Francis by poison.

  3. Procedural History

  4. Legal Question

    1. Can D have the property afforded to him in the will?

  5. Holding and Reasoning: Earl

    1. No, because that would be absurd, and was not intended by the legislators.

    2. Arguments against:

      1. Will has been made in due form and admitted to probate. According to letter of law regarding wills and devolution of property, if they cannot be modified or controlled, property goes to the murderer.

      2. Purpose of statutes was to enable testators to dispose of their estates according to legally expressed wishes. Intention of lawmakers was for donees to receive what was willed to them.

    3. Arguments for:

      1. “It never could have been their intention that a donee who murdered the testator to make the will operative should...

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