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Personal Jurisdiction SEE GLANNON
1. Types of Jurisdiction Type
judgment makes D personally liable, however money damages can be enforced by seizing D's property
transient jurisdiction ok (service valid even if brief trip). See Grace v. MacArthur (E.D.Ark. 1959) p.688 (D served on plane flying over AL, service valid though court said that planes may soon fly too high)
Judgment to establish title to property - binding on whole world
Admiralty, libel, land title registration suits.
in the nature of rem
Dispose of property in regards to parties in case, not other parties
Directed against specific property, not a person.
quasi in rem
State asserts personal jurisdiction over D by virtue of their property in state
Notable example - skier sued for child support on basis of underwear left in state. Suit can be for more than value of property, but recovery not for more than value.
Type I: P sues to enforce a preexisting interest in the property (like a mortgage)
Type II - P sues to apply property to unrelated claim against property's owner
2. Types of In Personam Jurisdiction: a. Service while physically present in forum (Pennoyer) b. Domicile in forum (General Jurisdiction) c. Consent (Hess v. Pawlowski) d. Minimum Contacts (Int'l Shoe) i. Contacts related to cause of action (specific jurisdiction) ii. Substantial or pervasive contacts unrelated to cause of action (general jurisdiction)
3. Personal Jurisdiction a. 14th Amendment Due Process Clause - No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. i. Framework of PJ - every state has exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory; no state can exercise direct jurisdiction outside its territory
1. Pennoyer Rule: Judgment in personam requires personal service of process in state. Substituted service by publication is allowed where (1) property is brought under court by seizure or some equivalent act (quasi in rem), or (2) judgments in rem. a. A court may enter judgment against a non-resident if the party is personally served within the state, or has property in the state that is attached before litigation begins (quasi in rem)
2. X?Pennoyer v. Nef (US 1877) p.681 a. Neff resided in CA, was sued by Mitchell over unpaid legal fees in OR. Mitchell served Neff by newspaper publication in OR because his address was unknown. Mitchell obtained default judgment in OR against Neff,
seized title to Neff's land (obtained after suit) for sheriff's auction, then bought it for the value of the judgment ($341.60), and sold to Pennoyer. Neff sued Pennoyer over the land title, which he said was worth 15K. b. Holding: No PJ, Neff got his land back from Pennoyer c. Based on international law principles respecting power within borders d. Policy justification for curtailing state court power in Pennoyer?
i. Don't want to be unfair to Ds (Cf. Hansberry v. Lee) ii. Full faith & credit clause (Article IV Section 1) doesn't apply because there is a question of whether first judgment is valid iii. 14th Amendment - due process concerns with personal jurisdiction (however not ratified until after Pennoyer)
4. Precursors to Minimum Contacts a. Debt travels with debtor (i.e. person who owes money) (quasi in rem) i.
[?] Harris v. Balk (US 1905) p. 693 (quasi in rem)
1. Harris (NC) owed Balk (NC) $180. Balk owed Epstein (MD) $344. Harris travels to MD and is sued by Epstein for $180 (attaching Harris' debt to Balk to Balk's debt to Epstein). Harris pays Epstein and then is sued by Balk in NC for the $180. SCOTUS rules for Harris on grounds that Balk had notice of proceedings in MD because he sued Harris immediately after his return to NC, and Balk had opportunity to litigate judgment in MD. b. Implied consent i. [?] Hess v. Pawloski, (US 1927) p. 696
1. MA court has personal jurisdiction over a driver who caused a car accident while driving in Massachusetts. Non-resident driving on highway gives implied consent to appointment of registrar as agent on whom process may be served. Not a due process violation.
2. Personal jurisdiction is based on intent.
1. General v. Specific Personal Jurisdiction a. In specific jurisdiction, the claim arises out of D's contacts in the forum, while general jurisdiction permits all claims against D in forum, even if unrelated to D's contacts in that forum.
2. Minimum Contacts Test a. "Traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice" i. [?] International Shoe v. Washington (US 1945) p.700 - due process requires only minimum contacts with forum in order to subject a D to a judgment in personam. Must not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice'" (citing Milliken v. Meyer).
1. Del. Corp. with headquarters in St. Louis employed 11-13 salesmen working on commission in Washington; sued by State of WA in WA court over unpaid unemployment fund contributions. Notice served personally on company salesman in WA and by registered mail to headquarters in MS. a. SCOTUS rejects Pennoyer doctrine that personal presence in territory is necessary for suit - company has no offices, warehouses, etc. in state.
2. Presence should be continuous and systematic and give rise to the liabilities sued on (specific jurisdiction).
3. Casual presence, isolated activities not enough for general jurisdiction, but may be enough for specific jurisdiction (See Hess v. Pawloski)
4. Not a mechanical or quantitative test depends on quality and nature of activity
5. Purposeful availment doctrine - "but to the extent that a corporation exercises the privilege of conducting activities within a state, it enjoys the benefits and protections of the law of that state. The exercise of that privilege may give rise to obligations..."
b. State Long-Arm Statutes as a response to Int'l Shoe. i. States created long-arm statutes to define jurisdiction rules. There is no constitutional requirement that a state exercise its jurisdiction to the maximum extent permitted by the due process clause - the state legislature, rather than Constitution, grants jurisdiction in state.
1. Long-arm statutes define specific rather than general jurisdiction ii. Reasons for long-arms: to give notice, narrow rules to attract business. iii. Some states just said jurisdiction must be consistent with Constitution (CA).
2. Advantage of self-adjusting as interpretations change iv. Model long-arm statute was IL 1955.
3. Gave PJ over any cause of action arising from (a) in state business transactions; (b) a tortious act in the state; (c) ownership, use or possession of real estate in the state; or (d) contracting to insure any person, property or risk located within this State at the time of contracting.
** Long-arms will be on the exam. How to tackle:
1. Look at state statute, tell story of how facts fit
2. Constitutional analysis - make sure statute is consistent with due process clause a. Case could fit statute but not the constitution ("Bulge" test). b. Use case analysis here i. What to make of statutes that list conditions then say also to the full extent of the constitution? See revised IL long-arm, p.716
ii. [?] Gray v. American Radiator, (Ill. 1961) pp.712, 714
4. Water heater manufactured by D in PA explodes in IL; P sues both American Radiator and an OH company that made the faulty safety valve in IL court.
5. Stream of commerce theory - Ds subject to PJ in forums in which it expects its products to be marketed.
6. IL long-arm statute applied on the basis of a tortious act committed in the state when the heater exploded. c. Single or isolated activities DO support specific jurisdiction where state has a strong interest i. [?] McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., (US 1957) p.707
1. Lowell Franklin (CA) buys life insurance from a company later bought out by Int'l Life Ins. (TX). Int'l sends renewal form, Lowell accepts. When he dies, Int'l refuses to pay out to his beneficiary, who then gets judgment against Int'l Life in CA, but Texas courts won't enforce against Int'l Life or give judgment full faith and credit on grounds that CA court had no PJ against Int'l Life.
2. Minimum contacts test - this was D's only policy in CA, but one contract is enough for specific jurisdiction in CA.
3. CA court has interest in protecting residents when insurers refuse to pay claims, also a fairness issue to P.
4. Note - would premium payments be systematic and continuous?
d. Purposeful Availment Doctrine - D subject to SJ in state when it invokes benefits and protections of state (under minimum contacts) i. Origin of purposeful availment language
1. X Hanson v. Denckla (US 1958) p. 711 a. Delaware trust set up by PA resident who later moves to FL. One of three daughters is her beneficiary, the other two sue in FL after her death and the trust is declared invalid. SCOTUS reverses because there was no purposeful availment by trustee in FL.
b. How to distinguish from McGee? CA has a stronger interest in making sure life insurance policies are paid out c. If trustee had failed to remit sums due, FL would have jurisdiction because debt travels (See Harris v. Balk) ii. Child support is not purposeful availment
1. X Kulko v. Superior Court (US 1960) p.731 a. Child support/divorce battle. Father in NY sued for child support in CA after buying his children tickets to go live there. SCOTUS holds that CA has no PJ over father - policy reason of not discouraging parents from entering reasonable visitation agreements. Court did minimum contacts analysis no purposeful availment, rejects CA interest in case. See also Burnham, infra. iii. Casual or Isolated Contacts -> No purposeful availment
1. X World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, (US 1980), p.720 a. P purchased an Audi from Seaway (D1), a NY car dealership. P was moving to AZ but gets in a serious accident in OK and Audi catches on fire. P sues in OK: German car manufacturer P (NY) v.
American importer NY tri-state distributer (WWV) NY retail dealer (Seaway)
b. White Opinion: No PJ because no foreseeability that D would be haled into court in OK
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