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Law Outlines Civil Procedure Outlines

Jurisdiction And Preclusion Outline

Updated Jurisdiction And Preclusion Notes

Civil Procedure Outlines

Civil Procedure

Approximately 56 pages

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STAGE ONE: JURISDICTION & PRECLUSION

  1. Personal Jurisdiction – U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV; FRCP 4

    1. Synthesized Rule

      1. If state has general jurisdiction over Δ, Π may sue Δ in state for any good reason. This is established by domicile or possibly “systematic and continuous” operations in a state.

      2. If state has specific jurisdiction over Δ, Π may only sue Δ in state for reasons due to Δ’s contact with the state. This is established by minimum contacts.

    2. Textual Rule

      1. Due Process: state/federal deprivations of life/liberty/property require due process. U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV.

      2. Establishing Jurisdiction: serving a summons establishes personal jurisdiction over a Δ who is subject to the state of the court or who is a party joined under Rule 14 or 19 and is served not more than 100 miles from where the summons was issued or when authorized by federal statute. FRCP 4(k).

      3. Δ Not Subject to Any Jurisdiction: if case is federal question, summons also establishes P.J. over Δ who is not subject to jurisdiction in any state’s courts, so long as consistent with the U.S. Constitution and laws. FRCP 4(k).

    3. Analysis

      1. Establishing Jurisdiction

        1. If the state court would have jurisdiction, the federal court in the state also has P.J. FRCP 4(k)(1)(A).

        2. There are two types: specific jurisdiction and general jurisdiction.

      2. Standards for Establishing Specific Jurisdiction

        1. There must be an affiliation between the forum and the controversy, via minimum contacts, fair play, purposeful availment, “systematic & continuous,” etc. Goodyear.

        2. J. McIntyre “Purposeful Availment” Standard (2011)

          1. Δ must purposefully avail itself of privileges of conducting activities in a state for it to have P.J., with the minor exception of intentional torts. This standard includes the explicit consent of Δ, i.e. Pennoyer; the presence within a state at time of suit, i.e. Int’l Shoe; and citizenship, domicile, or principal place of business.

          2. The standard rejects foreseeability; jurisdiction is question of sovereignty, not fairness.

          3. Similar to O’Connor’s dissent in Asahi, that Δ must have a “substantial connection” with state.

        3. World Wide Volkswagen “Stream of Commerce” Standard (1980)

          1. If Δ can reasonably foresee that it could be haled into court by participating in a stream of commerce, P.J. is okay. But the foreseeability must be reasonable, i.e. Π who unilaterally visits different state is not enough. World Wide Volkswagen.

        4. Int’l Shoe “Minimal Contacts” Standard (1945)

          1. Whenever Δ exercises privilege of doing business in state, this may give rise to specific jurisdiction over the activity if Δ has “minimal contacts” with the state; some isolated/sporadic acts of such nature to justify “presence,” e.g. Hess.

            1. Another example: an insurance company had one Cal. policy; this was enough for Cal. to have P.J. over that policy. McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co. (U.S. 1957).

        5. Silver “Valid Interest” Standard (N/A)

          1. A state should have personal jurisdiction over Δ if it has a valid interest in doing what it wants to do, e.g. protect its citizens from threatening Δ who never set foot in state.

      3. Standards for Establishing General Jurisdiction

        1. Applies to Δ’s home, domicile, principal place of business, or “systematic and continuous” operation in state; it means state has unlimited P.J. over Δ for anything. Goodyear. This is much easier to establish than specific jurisdiction, if true, and is based in consent.

        2. Tag Jurisdiction

          1. Warm-bodied Δs may be “tagged” with general jurisdiction simply by entering a state, so lnog as they were not forced to be there. E.g. Burnham v. Super. Ct. (U.S. 1990): N.J. Δ travelled to Cal. for business and was served with Cal. divorce by wife. Since he was in the state, state has P.J. over him.

          2. This does NOT apply to corporations.

          3. Partnerships are considered groups of individuals; if one member of a partnership is in, e.g., New York, he may be served on company’s behalf. First American Corp. v. Price Waterhouse LLP (2d Cir. 1998).

        3. Domicile

          1. Applies to where Δ both resides and intends to reside indefinitely.

        4. Principal Place of Business; Corporations v. Unions/Partnerships

          1. “Principal place of business” of corps. is determined in various ways, e.g. “nerve center.” But if Δ has systematic and continuous operation in a state, it may be subject to PJ even if not the principal place of business.

          2. Examples

            1. Philippine corp. that temporarily had principal place of business in Ohio. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co. (U.S. 1952).

            2. Corp’s regular purchases from Tex. not gen. jur. Helicopteros (U.S. 1984).

        5. Pennoyer “Consent” Standard (1878)

          1. State has absolute power within its borders, and none outside of them. Service must be within the state, and presence in state is prerequisite for jurisdiction. Pennoyer v. Neff (U.S. 1878).

          2. This applies to “tag” jurisdiction, too. Burnham.

      4. Service & Enforcement

        1. Service done in-state establishes P.J.; most states don’t allow this when Δ was forced to go there.

        2. The minimum contact / stream of commerce / purposeful availment standards are all alternatives for determining whether an absent Δ’s property (quasi in rem) is related to litigation, not whether a present party may be served with process. Burnham.

        3. If State A has P.J. over Δ, State B must enforce its decisions. U.S. Const. art. IV. But if State A does not have P.J. over Δ, State B cannot enforce A’s decisions because of the 14th Amendment.

        4. If Δ never returns to State A or State B, either may enforce “quasi in rem” jurisdiction by attaching property to the claim to force Δ to appear. If Δ does not, the sheriff may sell the property.

      5. Special Appearances (State Court Only)

        1. Δ who rejects claim to jurisdiction may make a special appearance in state court to challenge jurisdiction via a writ of prohibition, if challenging it in litigation would, itself, establish jurisdiction. This occurred in Int’l Shoe and World Wide Volkswagen.

    4. Cases

      1. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations v. Brown...

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