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Law Outlines Legislation and Statutory Interpretation Outlines

Theories Of Legislation Outline

Updated Theories Of Legislation Notes

Legislation and Statutory Interpretation Outlines

Legislation and Statutory Interpretation

Approximately 87 pages

This law school outline is for a course on Legislative Law, which examines issues relating to the enactment, application and interpretation of legislation, primarily at the federal level. The course introduced students to the basic contours of Congressional lawmaking practice, theoretical models of the legislative process, the application and interpretation of statutes by the executive branch, and numerous aspects of judicial statutory interpretation. Students will explored and critiqued the diff...

The following is a more accessible plain text extract of the PDF sample above, taken from our Legislation and Statutory Interpretation Outlines. Due to the challenges of extracting text from PDFs, it will have odd formatting:

I.TheoriesofLegislation

1)Pluralism/PublicChoiceTheory

Pluralism:Statutesareproductsofcompetingandinteractinginterestgroups,andcertain

groups'interestswillbeshutout.

Interpretiveimplication:Congressshouldengageinpublicspirited

interpretation.Moredeferenceshouldbegiventostatutethathasdiffusebenefits

thanonethathasconcentratedbenefits,andmoredeferenceshouldbegivento

groupwhoseinterestshavebeenshutout.Riskofthisisjudicialactivism.

Specialinterestlegislation

targetedtaxbreaks

industrydrivenlegislation

PublicChoice:politiciansarerationalutilitymaximizerswhotrytomaximizetheirown

interests.Costsofstatutes,andtheirbenefits,mightbeeitherconcentratedordiffuse

Interpretiveimplication:PosnerianL+Etheoryimpliesthatsatuteshouldbe

treatedascontractualnegotiation—eachperson'sinterests+compromisesindeal

oughttoberetainedinstatutoryinterpretation.

Concentratedcosts,diffuse Concentratedcosts,concentrated

benefits"entrepreneurial"politics;CRA benefitsinterestgrouppolitics

sexamendmentwasadvertisedasthis,but itwasreallydiffusecosts+diffusebenefits

Diffusecosts,concentrated Diffusecosts,diffusebenefitsmajoritarian

benefitsspecialinterest/clientlegislation politics

2)Proceduralist/DeliberativeTheory

Thereis"finelywrought"processwherebyCongressenactsstatutes,givingCongress

highlegitimacy

Becauseanypieceofstatutehastopassmanyvetogates,theyshouldbegivenmuch

deference

Medianvotertheoryoflegislativepurpose:whoamongvetogatesis"medianvoter"?

51st%tileinHouse

60thvoteinSenate(filibusters—usedtobe67thvote)

Mediancommitteemember

Committeechair

President

Conferencecommittee

NOTELINKTOSTATUTORYINTERPRETATION—PURPOSIVISM

Interpretiveimplicationsaredivergent:

2

Hasbeenusedtosupporttextualism

legitimacyoftext(haswithstoodvetogates)usedtocriticize

congressionalinactionarguments

look@4cornersofdocumenttopreservedealsmade

Hasbeenusedtosupportlegislativeintent

Legislationisseriesofdeals,andaswithparolevidenceincontract,

legislativehistoryisevidenceofdeals

Bestwaytodeterminepurposeistolook@medianvoter(butthenraises

questionofwhoismedianvoter?)

3)PositivePoliticalTheoryandInstitutionalistAccounts

Creationofstatutorymeaningisanongoing,interactiveprocessthatplaysoutovertime

Multipleinstitutions,includingagencies,legislativebranch,executivebranch,judicial

branch,interestgroupsparticipateandinteracttogivemeaning;actorsaresophisticated

andunderstandthisinteractivegame

Congressenactsstatutesunderstandingwhereeachofplayerslieonspectrum,andwill

trytopleasemedianvoter

Interpretiveimplication:Shouldcourtsgivedeferencetootherinterpreters(agencies),or

looktocurrentCongress?

HowaBillBecomesaLaw

1. Draftingofbills(bylegislativestaff,governmentagency,interestgroup,academic)

HOUSE

2. Introductionofbillbymember(appropriationsandrevenuebillstypicallyoriginatein

House)

3. ReferraltoStandingCommittees

4. CommitteeAction(canbeforgonebydischargepetitionbyHouse)

3steps:1)consideration2)markup3)report:a)exactlanguageofbillb)sectionbysection

analysisofbillc)proceduralandsubstantivebackground

5. 6. 7.

Canbereferredtosubcommittee

Hearingsheldonmajorbills

Committeeresolution:takenoaction,defeat,accept,oramendandreport

Votingoutofcommittee

Rulescommittee(majorbills)

Floordebateandamendment(passageordefeat)

SENATE

8. ReferredtoStandingCommittee

9. CommitteeAction

10. Flooraction—notefilibusteroption

CONFERENCECOMMITTEE

IfHouse+Senatepassdifferingversions,conferencecommitteecanbecreatedwith

membersfromeachhouse;eachhousemustagreetoconferencereport

Appealsofcommittees

Specialization+expertise

3

Rentseeking:committeememberschoosecommitteesontopicsabouta)whichthey

andtheirconstituentshavestrongpreferencesb)whichtheyhaveselfinterestin

Forcesothercommitteememberstodiligentlymonitoractivitiesofinterested

committeemembers

Toolsofmajorityparty:majoritypartywilldefertointensepreferencesofcommittee

membersinreturnforsupportonissuesvitaltoreelectionofmajority

NonLinearLegislativeProcesses

1)Filibuster Unclearwhetherit'sconstitutional;Rugerthinksnot

Minorityofsenatorsdelaybringingbilltobevotedon,takingadvantageofSenate's

unlimiteddebaterule

2tracksystem:

1)HoldsSenatorcanaskMajorityLeadertoplacetemporary+anonymous

holdonlegislationheadedtowardfloor decreasespoliticalaccountabilityand

itscheapnessmeansit'susedmore,soSenatorsshouldbefairintheiruse

2)ThreatoffilibusterSenatorneedsbackingofpartyinordertoprevent

cloture.IfSenatorthreateningfilibusteris3dparty+nooneagreeswhim,his

filibusterisworthlessbcitcanbeeasilydefeated.

Cloture:votetoendfilibuster+forcevote(SenateRuleXXII)

Initiallyneeded2/3(67Senators);since1975,haveonlyneeded60Senators

(nothingmagicalaboutthisnumber)

SenateRulesneed2/3ofSenatetobechanged

Art.I§5givesHouse+Senateauthorityto"determineRulesofits

Proceedings" filibusterisrulefordebate

Useoffilibusters:

Executivenominations

Ambassadors

FederalofficialsworkinginWhiteHouse

Judicialnominations

Therefore,minoritypartycanblockPresident'snominationsofjudges,

executivepolicymakers,diplomats,etc.

PROS:

givesvoicetominority

forcescompromise

Senatetradition

Enhancesroleofmoderates(buttherearefewermoderatestoday)

CONS:

maybeunconstitutional

evenifnotunconstitutional…

holds,becausetheyareanonymous,amounttoavoidanceof

accountability

morepartisan?

Slowsdownlegislativeaction

Usedasabargainingtool

Antimajoritarian

4

Mightnotbeabletobeabletocreatecompromise—1994government

shutdown

Arefilibustersunconstitutional?

YES NO

ruleagainstsurplusageandexpressio listofpermissiblesupermajoritiesmay

uniusthereare7otherplacesinConstitution besuggestiveasopposedtoexclusive

thatrequiresupermajority,sosupermajoritiesare Article5§1allowsSenatetowriteits

confinedtotheseprovisions ownrules

Overrideveto It'sapoliticalquestion,whichis

Proposingconstitutionalamendments judiciallyunreviewable

Convictionbyimpeachment Tradition!Becauseithasbeenaroundforso

Houseimpeaches(actslike long,itwouldbeviolationofproceduraldue

indictment),Senateconvicts processtodoawaywith...

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