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Law Outlines Legislation and Statutory Interpretation Outlines

Theories Of Statutory Interpretation Outline

Updated Theories Of Statutory Interpretation Notes

Legislation and Statutory Interpretation Outlines

Legislation and Statutory Interpretation

Approximately 87 pages

This law school outline is for a course on Legislative Law, which examines issues relating to the enactment, application and interpretation of legislation, primarily at the federal level. The course introduced students to the basic contours of Congressional lawmaking practice, theoretical models of the legislative process, the application and interpretation of statutes by the executive branch, and numerous aspects of judicial statutory interpretation. Students will explored and critiqued the diff...

The following is a more accessible plain text extract of the PDF sample above, taken from our Legislation and Statutory Interpretation Outlines. Due to the challenges of extracting text from PDFs, it will have odd formatting:

II.TheoriesofStatutoryInterpretation

PotentialUnderlyingNorms

RuleofLawpredictability,stability,accessibilitybycitizenry

DemocraticLegitimacydeferencetodecisionbypopularlyelectedlegislators

Pragamaticsinterpretershaveadutytocontributeproductivelytoastatutoryscheme

andthecommongood

DecisionRulesWewantadecisionrulethatoptimizesbothaccuracyandlegitimacy

Accuracy

Getridofideologicaldiscretion

Getridofinfighting

E.g.coinflippingwillgiveusunanimousdecisions,judgeswilltotally

abandontheirpoliticalbackgroundsandideologicalpositions

Legitimacy

Usesophisticated,consistentmethodology

Backupyourassertionswithevidence

E.g.textualistanalysiswillprobablybeveryprincipled,butisit

accurate?Couldbeveryresultsoriented

"FunnelofAbstraction"

OurIntellectualframeworkisnotsingleminded,butreflectdifferentunderstandingand

differentvalues.AsdescriptionofwhatCourtisdoing,veryunrealistictosayCourtis

justdoingonething(textualism,purposvism).Fewjudgespracticebylookingatoneand

onlyonefoundationalmethod.Thevectorfrom"concrete"to"abstract"shouldn'tbe readas"determinate"meaningto"indeterminate"meaning.Tosaythatsomethingis

concreteisdiffromsayingthemeaningisobjectivelydeterminable.

Rankingofdifferentinterpretationsfrommostconcretetomostabstract,withoutplacing

normativevalueonconcretenessorabstractness

Verticallydownlevelsandhorizontallyoneachlevel:frommostconcretetomost

abstract

1. Statutorytext(specificordinarymeaninginprovision;wholeact;wholecode)

Couldputstaredecisisonstatutorytexthere

2. Specificlegislativehistoryonpoint(intent)

3. Generallegislativepurpose("mischief"rule)

4. Evolutionofthestatute(agencies,courts(staredecisis),otherstatutes,external

events)

5. Legalcoherencenorms(constitutionality+rationality)

6. Currentpolicyconcerns(metavaluessuchasequity,coherence,+fairness)

HistoricalUsages:HolyTrinitywhentextwentagainstBrewer,usedotherfactorsto

arriveathisoutcome

2waysofevaluatingeclecticarguments

Chainsmetaphor:onerottenapplespoilsthebunch(soonlymakereallygood

arguments?)

Cablesmetaphor:inthesecasesresultwilldependonstrongestoverallcombination

ofthreads.That,inturn,dependsonwhichvaluesdecisionmakersfindmost

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important,andonstrengthofargumentsinvokingeachvalue.

HistoricalDevelopment

19thCentury:eclecticism(HolyTrinity)

endof19thCentury:HolmesianTextualism

mid20thCentury:purposivism

Criticism:ifstatutehasmanydifferentpurposes,whichpurposedowechoose?(e.g.J.

TattinginCaseofSpelunceanExplorers)

late20 thCentury:NewTextualismandDynamicStatutoryInterpretation

Criticism:iflawisamess(e.g.InMatterofJacob)orisambiguous(e.g.whatdoes

"DueProcess"mean?),itisjudge'sjobtointerpret

19691986:CourtConsidersLegislativeHistory

19871995:PeakofNewTextualism

Mostoftenfoundplainmeaning

OnlyinhandfulofcaseshasCourtreliedonlegislativehistorytointerpretstatute

againstitsplainmeaning:UsuallyStevensorSouteruseimaginativereconstruction,

withScaliadissenting

1995OnwardInstitutionallegislativehistory

Breyer,TheUsesofLegislativeHistory Breyerhaspushedcourttoexamine

legislativematerialsmoreoften

Midwaybetweenimaginativereconstructionandtextualism

ButEFGnotethattherearemorecaseslikeCircuitCity(whereCourtrefused

toexaminelegislativematerials)thanlikeSweetHome(whereevenScalia

consideredlegislativehistory)

Courttreatslegislativeprocessasgroupengagedincoordinatedpurposiveaction:

Committeesgroupreliesonguidance+judgmentofsubgroups

Enactmentofstatutesgroupratifiespubliclypresentedunderstandings

Court'sroleistocontinuethatlegislativeproject(deferentialtolegislative

process)

RobertsCourt

StatutorytextiscentralinquiryofSCOTUSandcourtsfollowingit

Courtoftenusesdictionarymeanings

Courtcaresmoreaboutstatutorycontextthanhistoricalcontext

Courtuseswholecoderuleasopposedtowholeactrule

Willusetypicallegislatorstandardtoarrive@plainmeaning

EFGbreakdownRobertsCourt'scurrentmethodologyintoreductionist

fashioninto3partsequence:

1)Textanddictionaries

2)Wholeactandwholecode

3)Legislativehistory,andevolution

Fuller,"TheCaseoftheSpelunceanExplorers"

Facts:Dudley+Stephenslikecannibalism.

Statute:"Whoevershallwillfullytakethelifeofanothershallbepunishedbydeath."

Foster(purposivism/ImaginativeReconstruction):wouldacquit,sinceDs'conductisnot

1 1

withinspirit/purposeofstatute

MostsimilartoHart&SacksandPound

Judge'sjobistointerpretinlightofoverallpurposeandtotrytofigureoutwhat

Congresswouldhavedoneifconfrontedwiththisproblem

Purposeofthemurderstatuteistodeterwrongdoing,butthatdoesn'tapply

here

Assumesidealizedlegislature

Keen(textualist):wouldconvict

Plainmeaningprecludesusingequitiesofcase(lawisdistinctfrommorality)

Judicialdeferenceismoredemocraticandrespectsinstitutionalcompetence(let

legislaturefixtheirmistakes)

Handy(pragmatist/Realist):wouldacquit

RobertJackson mostsimilartoBlackmun,Breyer,orPosneroftoday

CommonSense/Policybasedapproach("allgovernmentofficials,includingjudges,

willdotheirjobsbestiftheytreatforms+abstractconceptsasinstruments")

Eclecticism

GoldenRule(LordBlackburn):followplainmeaningunlesstodosowouldleadtoan

inconsistencyorabsurdity.Allowsjudgestorewritestatutesinordertoavoidabsurd

consequences.

BrewerinHolyTrinity:"thingmaybewithinletterofstatuteandyetnot

withinthestatute,becausenotwithinitsspirit,notwithinintentionofits

makers."

Sometimes,judgeswillclaimtheyreadwholestatutebutwillselectpartsof

statutetouseintheirinterpretation.E.g.BrewerinHolyTrinitydoesnotuse

otherpartsofstatutewhichareactuallyfavorabletohisinterpretation.

Criticism:whoisdecidewhatisabsurd?

LiteralRule(LordAckinsonandLordBramwell):Legislatureintendedwhatitplainly

expressed.Doesnotmatterifplainexpressionleadstoabsurdresults,bcit'snotcourt'sjob todecidewisdomofpolicy+alsowisdomissubjective.Courtshouldstillenforceabsurd

result,andlegislaturecanfixit

MischiefRule:presumesthatstatutesarecreatedtoaddress"defects"orpointsof

"mischief"incommonlaw—loopholespeoplecantakeadvantageof,doctrinesthatleadto

injustice/inefficiency,undesirablebehaviorthatcommonlawdoesnotproperlyaddress,...

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