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Constitutional Law Attack Outline

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This is an extract of our Constitutional Law Attack document, which we sell as part of our Constitutional Law Outlines collection written by the top tier of University Of Virginia School Of Law students.

The following is a more accessble plain text extract of the PDF sample above, taken from our Constitutional Law Outlines. Due to the challenges of extracting text from PDFs, it will have odd formatting:

Constitutional Law Attack Outline Spring 2015 - UVA Law

Judicial ReviewMarbury (1803): Court has power to review laws in light of the constitution (cannot expand Article 3) and is binding on other branchesMartin v. Hunter's Lessee (1816): This is also binding on the states. o Limit: state supreme courts on state constitutional issues, needs federal questionU.S. v. Klein (1972): congress cannot use appellate jurisdiction control to change outcome of one caseCooper v. Aaron (1958): Death of departmentalism; SCOTUS is supreme interpreter of constitution (Eisenhower enforced opinion he disagreed with) o Hollingsworth v. Perry (2013): exception, state officials are not bound to defend laws in court against constitutional challengesWalter Nixon v. U.S. (1993): non-justicible question, textually demonstrative commitment to coordinate branch (constitution doesn't say anything about it) - different from passing laws in generalSee also standing

Commerce Clause (see also Necessary & Proper)Gibbons v. Ogden (1824): Includes regulation of goods in movement, also implicitly preempts state regulation.Champion v. Ames (Lottery Case): OK to use moral reasons to regulate instrumentalities of commerce that cross state linesHouston East & West Texas RR (Shreveport Rate Case, 1914): OK to regulate intrastate commerce that affects interstate commerce (through instrumentalities of commerce).

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Hammer v. Dagenhart, (1918) Overruled: Pre-New Deal, based on morality + intrastate commerce that merely affected interstate commerce could be too attenuated. o Refusal to combine Champion v. Ames moral reasons with Shreveport Rate Case intrastate regulations o Carter Coal (1936): Overruled, Labor law struck down for being too attenuated, no "direct effect" o Schecter Poultry (1935): Wage and hour law struck down for being too attenuatedNLRB v. Jones and Laughlin Steel (1937): E.g. vertically integrated activities cannot be done except through interstate commerce, so Congress may regulateDarby (1941): Intrastate activities with moral reasons that have an interstate effect may be regulated. New Deal. Sawmill case. Overrules Dagenhart. 10th Amendment = truism o Allows Champion v. Ames and Shreveport Rate Case to be combined. Moral reasons with interstate effect/presenceWickard (1942): Fungible goods may be aggregated to find interstate commerce even if the individual person regulated acts purely intrastate. (Kansas wheat farmer)Heart of Atlanta (1964): Channels of interstate commerce, e.g. hotels on an interstate highway, may be regulated for moral reasons. These are also taken in aggregationKatzenbach v. McClung (1964): Aggregation of businesses may restrict blacks' willingness to travel which will affect interstate commerce. Based on data, defer to congress o Must have rational basis for regulating the industryPerez (1971): Broadest possible interpretation. Moral reasons with tenuous interstate effect--aggregate of intrastate loan sharks may affect interstate commerce. Deference to the judgment of the legislature. Part of class that impacts interstate commerce even if some don't, not an aggregate caseMorton v. Bloom (1973): Beginning of limits. Individual factual circumstances (one-man mine) can put you outside of the interstate commerce Congress intended to regulate.Lopez and Morrison (1995, 2000): Four factor test walking back the line from Darby and eliminating full legislative deference: now questions the findings of Congress o Current Indicators: (1) Intention of Congress--economic/business related?; (2) jurisdictional hook; (3) requirement and evaluation of Congressional findings; (4)

Attenuation of link to commerce/substantiality of relation w/o deference to congress. o Still in existence: (1) channels of interstate commerce (highways, Heart of Atlanta, Champion), (2) instrumentalities (e.g. vehicles, things in IC like goods) of interstate commerce, and (3) activities that substantially affect commerce o But see Gonzales (2005): marijuana may still be regulated because it is part of an interstate market. o See Comstock for prong (4)?
o Bigger concern for things normally left to the statesNFIB v. Sebelius (ACA Case, 2012): no majority, but not constitutional under commerce clause o Roberts: inactivity vs. activity o Scalia +: unconstitutional per Morrison

Necessary and ProperMcCulloch v. Maryland (1819): Necessary means facilitative or useful in achieving an enumerated power (does not need to be absolutely necessary)Comstock (2010): Need links in the chain; post-release prison detention center OK because it's connected to prisons which are needed to enforce laws made in pursuance of enumerated powers. Necessary and proper doesn't stand aloneKebodeaux (2013): Necessary and proper is not its own source of power, must be attached to an enumerated power, allows long chain.

Tenth AmendmentNational League of Cities: States may use 10th amendment to set lower minimum wages than federal government. OverruledGarcia (1985): Overruled National League of Cities and strips 10th amendment of its powerPrintz (1997): Lone exception: federal government may not commandeer state workers to do work that federal law enforcement should be doing.

Dormant Commerce Clause

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Preemption: Look for it first o Explicit Preemption: congress says states can't act o Implicit Preemption: conflicts with existing law o Occupation of the Field: so much federal regulation that it's apparent that Congress intended to keep the states out o Note: state subsidies, spending, are different. But taxing is notExplicit Protectionism and Discrimination: Always Unconstitutional o Bacchus Imports v. Dias: Hawaii can't tax other wine to favor its own wine o Baldwin v. JAF Seelig: Safety reasons are not enough to save protectionist regulations on fungible goods (prices for milk to oust out of staters) o Dean Milk v. Madison: Cannot draw geographic lines (even if they aren't state lines) to restrict sales of fungible goods o No need for explicit distinctionExplicit Discrimination and Implicit Protectionism: Presumption against state o Philadelphia v. New Jersey: Health and safety not enough to save law that forces private actors to explicitly discriminate by state. Must use other means to get to health concerns?

But: State-owned dumps can favor state customers (see spending powers) (see also state universities)

Facially Non-Discriminatory but Protectionist Motive: Presumption against state o Hunt v. Washington Apple: State safety standards cannot be made as such that they protect against out of state fungible goods. (in state apple inspection marks required, out of state sellers didn't have but normally had USDA)?

See Wallace v. Jaffrey for motives

Facially Non-Discriminatory, Not Protectionist, Discriminatory Impact: Balancing Test (still with burden on state) o Pike v. Bruce Church: Balance the local benefit against the broader burden on interstate commerce; unclear on where the presumption is

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