Law Outlines Legislation (Statutory Interpretation) Outlines
This outline was prepared for Legislation as taught by Prof. Caleb Nelson, the author of the textbook used (Statutory Interpretation). The package includes a major outline, an attack (short) outline, and a case list with page numbers on each outline in case document searching is not allowed during an exam. The outline covers 9 major topics including 1) purposivism vs. textualism (including implied exceptions, drafting errors, and rules vs. standards); 2) canons of construction (including descrip...
The following is a more accessible plain text extract of the PDF sample above, taken from our Legislation (Statutory Interpretation) Outlines. Due to the challenges of extracting text from PDFs, it will have odd formatting:
Purpose vs. Text
Implied Exceptions into Generally Worded Statutes:
(1) Imaginative Reconstruction: use purpose to resolve ambiguity, some do ad hoc
Riggs: legislature would have included slayer exception in wills statute
Church of the Holy Trinity: legislature couldn’t have wanted to restrict importing preachers
Speluncean (Foster): legislature didn’t consider this situation
(2) Fundamental Maxims of the Common Law: debate over whether it resolves ambiguity, or can contradict clear language of statute
Riggs: read nullus commodum into will statute to prevent slayers inheritance
Speluncean (Easterbrook): murder statute accommodates justification defenses
(3) Presumption Against Absurdity:
Church of the Holy Trinity: it would be absurd to restrict importing preachers
U.S. v. Kirby: mail interference statute can’t prevent arresting mailman murderer
Drafting Errors
(1) How to diagnose?
NELSON: if plain meaning is so odd that it is idiosyncratic, absurd, or nonsensical
Disagreement regarding certainty:
Locke: Marshall & Stevens disagree over threshold (“prior to 12/31”)
Amalgamated Transit: majority and Bybee disagree regarding certainty of whether “less” establishing a waiting period
Green v. Bock Laundry: Scalia “d” = “criminal d,” otherwise text doesn’t make sense
(2) Should you correct them? (see CAFA)
Spivey: diagnosed error in “less” establishing waiting period, did not correct it because of notice
Amalgamated Transit: diagnosed the same error AND corrected
See Presumption of Consistent Usage carrying idiosyncratic meaning elsewhere
Rules vs. Standards
Schauer: more rule-like means less room to use purpose in interpretation, more standard-like allows for more purpose
Jaskolski: (Easterbrook) courts should not change congress’ rules into standards with purpose (but see Easterbrook in Speluncean – reads background principles to change murder rule into more standard w/justification defenses)
Canons
Conflict between canons: most start with ordinary meaning, Nelson thinks descriptive trump normative, Llewellyn says they conflict so much as to be useless
Descriptive
Ordinary Meaning: common use of words, through dictionary, corpus analysis (media), etc. Whether it is used in a statute is a question of context
Term of Art: technical meaning in a field. Acquired through prior meaning in the law (e.g., CL and “seamen”), field, etc.
Noscitur a Sociis: a word is known by its companions
Jarecki: “discovery” in mining statute list only means for mineral resources
Maracich: “civil . . . proceeding” in DMV statute does not include lawyers soliciting clients for class action
See also Babbitt v. Sweet Home (harm endangered species), Gregory v. Ashcroft (judge retirement), Gustafson v. Alloyd Co. (prospectus), Yates v. U.S. (“tangible objects” fish)
Ejusdem Generis: generic catch-all at end of list is limited by items in the list
1st Cir.: weaker when general comes first (NELSON disagrees)
Circuit City: “any other class” only covers employees in transportation industries
Different from Last Antecedent and Series Qualifier Rules which address modifiers w/ lists
Presumption of Consistent Usage: legislatures use words the same way
See also in pare materia, interpretative statutes
Gustafson v. Alloyd Co. (prospectus)
Presumption Against Superfluity: don’t read ambiguous term to make other superfluous
See also Church of Holy Trinity (statute exempting artists, etc. from “labor/service”), Yates (if Kagen dissent correct, “other documents” is superfluous)
NELSON: congress may put redundancies in to remove doubt, e.g., Marx (removing doubt), Texas Department of Housing (assured safe harbor)
Expressio Unius: if a statute expresses one exception it implies the exclusion of others
NELSON: weak, overcome by showing congress assumed the exception exists
Marx: to use, must be fair to suppose Congress considered the unnamed possibility and meant to say no
Normative
NELSON: apply only when descriptive ones fail to clarify meaning, and must make ad hoc decision between 2+ permissible meanings
Rule of Lenity: intractable ambiguities are read to make penal law more lenient
Applies to interpretation of statutes that bear on civil and criminal penalties
Muscarello: justices disagree if “carry” is sufficiently ambiguous to trigger
Bailey: “uses . . . firearm” read narrowly, not explicitly lenity
Constitutional Canons
Savings Canon (Constitutional): if 1 of 2 permissible readings is unconstitutional choose the constitutional reading
Bidirectional over time, but see South-Eastern Underwriters (“commerce” took later more broad meaning)
Canon of Avoidance: either (1) narrow – avoid constitutional questions when calls statute constitutionality into question, or (2) broad – avoid constitutional questions even if statute constitutionality not in question
Bidirectional over time
NLRB v. Catholic Bishop: generally worded statute read to avoid 1A question of whether catholic school teachers must be able to collective bargain
Presumption of Severability: presume unconstitutional applications are severable from constitutional applications
Presumption Against Absurdity: see implied exceptions, drafting errors
Implied Limitation Canons
Presumption Against Extraterritoriality: (RJR Nabisco) look at each element of the statute to determine. Charming Betsey is the strongest version – can’t regulate conduct in other nations
(1) whether the presumption is overcome, and
EEOC v. Aramco (employment discrimination):: (majority) text doesn’t overcome vs. (dissent) weaker form given conduct being regulated is overcome by negative implication of exception, and Charming Betsey doesn’t apply bc U.S. company and employees
Morrison: (bank purchase mortgage co) needs clear text to overcome, no imaginative reconstruction
(2) whether the application would be extraterritorial
New York Central Railroad: choice of law says it’s a Canadian tort (Nelson likes)
...
Buy the full version of these notes or essay plans and more in our Legislation (Statutory Interpretation) Outlines.
This outline was prepared for Legislation as taught by Prof. Caleb Nelson, the author of the textbook used (Statutory Interpretation). The package includes a major outline, an attack (short) outline, and a case list with page numbers on each outline in case document searching is not allowed during an exam. The outline covers 9 major topics including 1) purposivism vs. textualism (including implied exceptions, drafting errors, and rules vs. standards); 2) canons of construction (including descrip...
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