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Law Outlines Long Torts Outline

Duty Scope Of Liability And Proximate Cause Outline

Updated Duty Scope Of Liability And Proximate Cause Notes

Long Torts Outline

Long Torts Outline

Approximately 84 pages

This Outline is a detailed compilation of several great outlines as well as notes on the professor's thoughts. It contains detailed explanations of "forks" in applying the law as well as ways to argue each claim. Must have for any Torts student, this outline was the sole reason I got an A....

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Duty, Scope of Liability, and Proximate Cause

  1. Intro to Proximate Cause

  1. ALWAYS CONSIDER POLICIES ON EVERY PC ISSUE:

    1. Courts want to make sure that all wrongdoers are deterred and especially those that are in the best position to avoid the harm. Sometimes this notion can explain why courts permit (or not) recovery for economic harm

    2. Courts seek a way to cut off liability that can be applied in a principled way. Sometimes leads to bright-line rules (as in Ryan and Dillon)

    3. Courts seeking to avoid “limitless liability” and provide a way for Ds to predict their exposure to liability. Leads to strong focus on forseeability of Ps and notion of “particular forseeability” as in People’s Airline.

  1. No single test to determine if D’s actions were the proximate cause of P’s harm as it is usually a policy factor, allowing P’s to recover when it seems right and not when it doesn’t etc.

  1. Background Rule, Harm Within the Risk: D’s negligent is the proximate cause of P’s injury if it increases the risk of harm that happens to P.

    1. If negligence increases the risk May be PC, go to Forseeability questions below

      1. In general, the closer in time and space, the more forseeable it is

    2. If negligence does NOT increase the risk, DV for D (Berry; Price)

  1. Prox Cause (no intermediate actor):

    1. Is some harm to the particular P forseeable? If no, DV for D (Palgraff)

      1. If yes, go to #2 (Palsgraff)

      2. If harm was emotional, use Zone of Danger or Dillon to identify forseeable P

        1. Dillon:

        2. Plaintiff must be located near scene of the accident

        3. Shock must have resulted from diret emotional impact upon the P from the sensory and contemptuous observance of the accident

        4. Plaintiff and victim must have been closely related

        5. Zone of Danger: Close proximity to the accident, in immediate apprehension of contact

      3. If harm is purely economic, P has to be forseeable in a particularistic kind of way (People’s Airline)- not endorsed by all jurisdictions- Must discuss the policy concerns behind pure economic harm of;

        1. No Fraud

        2. Connecting Ps and Ds through forseeablity

        3. No unlimited liability

    2. Is the extent of harm to the forseeable P forseeable? Does not matter P is liable for full extent of the injuries (Polemis)

    3. Is the type of harm that happened to the forseeable P very different from what made D negligent? Case-by-case exception- if so, not liable (Wagon-Mound)

      1. P will always try and characterize the harm suffered as different extent of harm

      2. D will always try and characterize the harm suffered as different type of harm (not of the same general sort and not from the same forces)

        1. Consider things like directness of harm and whether D is otherwise deterred.

          1. Many of these cases will go to the jury

  2. Prox Cause (intermediate actor) [Assuming Above Forseeability Rules are Met]

    1. Restatement: Does not matter whether D2 is intentional, negligent, criminal etc. as long as it is a harm within the risk

      1. If D2 is harm within the risk of D1’s negligenceintervening actor

        1. If not, superseding actor

    2. D1 can get off the hook by “capping their risk” (making it relatively safe) (Price). Therefore, any harm that is done to her after the risk is capped is not a result of D’s negligence increasing the probability of risk to her

    3. Or, D1 can get off the hook if somehow it gets into reasonably safe hands (Horton)

    4. If D violated a statutory duty that was atleast partially aimed at the harmed caused by a potential superseding actor- probably going to be PC (Ross)

  1. What if there is a struggle to find a line between personal injury and property damages on one hand and pure economic and emotional harm on the other?

    1. Courts may take the opportunity to cut off liability when the kind of harm that is being claimed shifts from physical to pure economic or emotional losses as in In re Kinsman

    2. In context of economic or emotional harm, look for situations where no other deterrence (Oppen-nobody to collect on behalf of fish) or where court can be satisfied of “particular forseeability” (People’s Airline and Amaya (Zone of D)/Dillon (Rules)) in which case court may be persuaded to send to jury on proximate cause question

  1. Berry v. Sugar Notch Borough (p.450)

    1. Plaintiff was traveling on the Borough of Sugar Notch. The ordinance of the borough had a speed limit of eight mph and plaintiff was going faster than that. Plaintiff was driving on the burrough in a violent windstorm, and his car was crushed by a tree that blew down while he was under it. P sued the borough, D asserted P’s speed was the cause of the injury.

      1. P’s speeding was definitely a but for cause of the accident: if he was not going the exact speed he was the tree would have never fallen on him

        1. However, there are risks associated with certain kinds of negligence (risks associated with speeding) and being hit by fallen trees is not one of them

        2. P’s breach of the safety statute was not casually connected with his injuries because the breach did not increase the risk or the hazard of him being struck

          1. If you can prove your negligence is no way associated with the harm, and D is definitely negligent, you get a directed verdict. (P’s want to make a case a Berry case).

          2. Statutes gives us an idea of what risks the particular type of negligence is trying to prevent, we can use it to say P’s negligence did not increase or contribute to the chance of the harm. He is not comparatively negligent.

  1. Holding: P gets to recover. “Berry Rule”: Was P’s injury a harm within the risk of D’s negligence? If yes, proximate cause. If no, (or if D’s actions did not increase risk to P), no proximate cause

  1. Ryan v. New York Central RR (p.446)

    1. Sparks flew from the defendant’s railroad and lit the defendant’s woodshed on fire, and then it spread to the plaintiff’s hose and other houses.

      1. Ryan Court adopts a bright-ine rule that says that D is responsible to pay for the destruction of the first building [proximate cause] (which just...

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