Case Briefs Outline

Chapter 2: Strict Liability and Negligence: Historic and Analytic Foundations Page: 102

NAME: The Thorns Case (Hull v. Orange) Y.B. Mich. 6 Ed. 4, f. 7, pl. 18 (1466)

FACTS:

• D was sued for trespassing on the plaintiff’s land in order to retrieve the branches of a hedge of thorns that had fallen while the defendant was cutting the hedge

PROCEDURE: Judgment for P (strict liability)

REASONING:

• Court held that the D was liable simply by the virtue of having trespassed no matter the reason. However, there was room left that suggested if the P had done everything in his power to prevent the branches from falling on D’s land, the result may have been otherwise.

Chapter 2: Strict Liability and Negligence: Historic and Analytic Foundations Page: 108

NAME: Weaver v. Ward, 80 Eng. Rep. 284 (K.B. 1616)

FACTS:

• P and D both in Military and are having a skirmish

• D shoots P in course of military exercise

PROCEDURE: Judgment for P

REASONING:

• Court rules that D must have been “utterly without fault” as if the P ran across his firing line.

• Liability for trespass exists except when D could not in anyway have been responsible for the injury (i.e. that is was inevitable).

Chapter 2: Strict Liability and Negligence: Historic and Analytic Foundations Page: 115

NAME: Scott v. Shepherd, 96 Eng. Rep. 525 (K.B. 1773)

FACTS:

• D threw a lighted squib (fireword) into a marketplace upon which it was subsequently picked up and thrown by others for their own safety until it landed at the P and exploded.

• P sued D for trespass

• D argued that P was not directly injured and therefore could not have sued for trespass but should have sued in case.

PROCEDURE: Judgment for P

REASONING:

• Court held that the D was liable as the harm was direct and therefore the trespass would lie but in doing so revealed how fragile the trespass and in case system was.

Chapter 2: Strict Liability and Negligence: Historic and Analytic Foundations Page: 123

NAME: Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. 292 (1850)

FACTS:

• D and P owned dogs that were fighting

• Upon trying to break up the dogs, D lifted a stick up over his head to strike the dog and instead, inadvertently struck the P in the eye.

PROCEDURE: Judgment for P

ISSUE: Does a motion brought for trespass only require direct forceful injury, and that the D exercised extraordinary due care?

HOLDING: No

REASONING:

• Trespass only occurs with intent or negligence

• Plaintiff has duty to prove intent or negligence rather than D

• Ordinary or due care only necessary (not extraordinary)

• P must be without negligence, damage is wholly by the act of D (no contributory negligence)

RULE

• If the act of hitting the plaintiff was unintentional, on the part of the defendant, and done in the doing of a lawful act, then the defendant was not liable, unless it was done in the want of exercise of due care, adapted to the exigency of the case, and therefore such want of due care became part of the P’s case, and the burden of proof was on the P to establish it.

DISPOSITION: New trial ordered

Chapter 3: The Negligence Issue Page: 171

NAME: Vaughn v. Menlove, 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (C.P. 1837)

FACTS:

• P owned cottages which he rented to two tenants.

• D was a neighbore to one of the tenants and had placed a hay stack or rick on his own property near the P’s two cottages.

• Rick was made at the boundary of D’s property and the hay was in such a state that when put together would give rise as to the discussion of probability of fire.

• For five weeks, D was warned about the danger but said that he, “would chance it”.

• Hay ignited destroying both D and P’s property.

PROCEDURE: Judgment for P

ISSUE: Did the trial court err in ordering the jury to decide whether or not the D was guilty of gross negligence or if they should have been asked only to rule whether he had acted bona fide to the best of his judgment?

HOLDING: No

REASONING:

• Lawyer for P – The only acceptable standard is the conduct of a man of ordinary prudence, as there would be no other rule that would be open to even greater uncertainties.

• Lawyer for D - Activity that the D was engaged in (storing of hay) was a legal activity and is therefore subject to no contract. Therefore, D argues that gross negligence ought to be measure by the faculties of the individual and not of other men (a subjective standard). The measure of prudence varies so with varying faculties of men, that it is impossible to say what is gross negligence with reference to the standard of what is called ordinary prudence.

• Judge Tindal – Rule of law is that you must enjoy your own property in a manner as not to injure that of another. Introduces foreseeability (i.e. unless the accident were occasioned by a sudden blast which he could no foresee). Instead of saying that the liability for negligence should be co-extensive with the judgment of each individual, we ought to adhere to the rule which requires in all cases a regard to caution such as a man of ordinary prudence would observe.

DISPOSITION: New trial ordere

Chapter 3: The Negligence Issue Page: 1178

NAME: Roberts v. Ring, 173 N.W. 437 (Minn. 1919)

FACTS:

• P, a boy of 7 years old was struck and injured by D’s (ages 77 and with sight and hearing defects) automobile.

• There was evidence that the boy was riding on the back of the automobile and was acting negligently.

• D was driving 4 to 5 mph, not a negligent rate of speed.

• D testified that when he was four to five feet from the boy he spotted the P but was no alert in stopping the car.

• Jury was posed with questions of negligence of both P and D and were asked to consider the age and physical infirmities of D as they relate to due care.

PROCEDURE: Judgment for D

ISSUE: Did the D’s infirmities relieve him of the charge of negligence

HOLDING: No

REASONING:

• D’s infirmities did not...

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